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Multiculturalism as a Cognitive Virtue of Scientific Practice 
 
Ann E. Cudd 
 
Despite nearly two decades of pathbreaking feminist epistemological research and 
writing and almost as many years of work on postcolonial and racial critiques of science, the 
mainstream of philosophical literature has yet to absorb the lessons of this work.  I find this 
especially disappointing because of the inroads made by the social epistemology movement, 
which now seems to have entered the mainstream of philosophy of science and epistemology.  
Mainstream philosophers require not merely good arguments but good reasons, stated in their 
terms, and using their traditions.   And being the mainstream, they are able to demand that.  In 
this paper, I shall argue for the lessons of the feminists and marginalized others in the language 
of the mainstream, making the arguments from the traditions of analytic philosophy.  In 
particular, the lesson I intend to impart is that the dominance of white male Westerners in 
science impoverishes science on its own terms, and that the inclusion of excluded others will 
improve the content and the very objectivity of science.  In short, multiculturalism is a cognitive 
virtue (not to mention a requirement of justice) for science. 
 
Foundations denied 
Foundationalism in the theory of knowledge is the idea that there are some first principles 
that can be established to be beyond doubt, and that on them we can justify whatever we are able 
to call knowledge.  Foundationalists oppose skepticism about our knowledge of the external 
world, but different foundationalists disagree about the source of that ultimate knowledge.  
However, many agree that our foundational knowledge must come to us as lone thinkers and 
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perceivers; we cannot look to society for justification of the knowledge, even if it is in society 
that we first learn or discover what we come to know.  Rene Descartes, in the first of his 
Meditations on First Philosophy, writes that after becoming aware of all the false opinions he 
had held from his youth, "I realized that for once I had to raze everything in my life, down to the 
very bottom, so as to begin again from the first foundations, if I wanted to establish anything 
firm and lasting in the sciences. ... I have secured for myself some leisurely and carefree time, I 
withdraw in solitude.  I will, in short apply myself earnestly and openly to the general 
destruction of my former opinions"(Descartes 1980, 57).  For Descartes, this project of finding 
the first foundations of science must be done in solitude because it requires clear thought, 
unbiased by the ideas or beliefs of others.  He needs to wipe his mind clean of the traditional 
beliefs of his society; what can be known can be discovered by the lone thinker without 
prejudice from social influence. 
Foundationalism of one sort or another has had a long run in epistemology.  It is fair to 
say that it was the going view in much of Western philosophy for nearly three hundred years 
after Descartes.  There is good reason for this: if we can have a firm foundation for our 
knowledge, then we can justify our beliefs one by one, knowing that justification entails that 
those beliefs are true, where "truth" is absolute,  independent of all observers, for all time.  But 
in the last forty years the foundations have crumbled, and antifoundationalist theories have taken 
their place in contemporary epistemology.  Some of these theories suggest that what we really 
ought to be doing in epistemology is cognitive psychology: we need to get clear on how our 
brains gather and sort information, create theories, and decide on evidence.i  This approach is 
naturalized epistemology.  Other antifoundationalist theories suggest that epistemology ought to 
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study how persons transmit knowledge within and across cultures, how experts in knowledge 
production are created, why some forms of systematic information do not count as knowledge, 
and what standards of objectivity, rationality, and good method are still useful.  This approach is 
sometimes called social constructivism.  Finally, a third group of antifoundationalist theories 
suggests that what we call epistemology is really ideology, that there is no such thing as 
objective knowledge, and that the word “knowledge” is simply an honorific for the 
pronouncements of those in power.  This is postmodernism.  In this paper I shall argue for a 
conservative version of  social constructivism, and shall show that it is a consequence of the 
social constructivist position that multiculturalism does indeed have something to offer to 
science on science’s own cognitive terms. 
To begin, we need to survey the rise and fall of foundationalism in the twentieth century. 
 The most important foundationalist theory in epistemology and the philosophy of science in the 
first half of this century was logical empiricism, or logical positivism.  The logical empiricists 
held that the foundation of our knowledge is to be found in perceptual experience, and that our 
perceptual experience can be rigorously analyzed so as to clear away any dubitable or biased 
elements.  Because the method simply requires attention to observation and adherence to a 
rigorous, logical method of analysis, it can be employed by a lone thinker.  And because the 
methods of analysis are logical, and hence universal, they are untouched by social, cultural, or 
moral values.  The empiricist theory of perceptual knowledge is phenomenalism; that is, the 
idea that physical objects are mental (logical) constructions out of sense data.  C. I. Lewis held  
that perceptual experience has two elements: the given and the concept.  The given is the 
noninferential, experiential element of knowledge -- the raw data.  The concept consists of the 
 Multiculturalism as Cognitive Virtue — p.4 
 
judgments we make from this raw data.  
To illustrate the difference, imagine a tennis ball.  The given element is that part of 
perception that forces itself on us, that is there for the perceiver who has never experienced 
tennis or tennis balls, as well as for you and me.  The “given” must exist, Lewis claimed, or our 
perceptual experience would be "contentless and arbitrary" (Lewis 1929, 39).  The concept is 
the judgment "there is a tennis ball."  It is also the judgment "there is something solid, spherical, 
fuzzy, and yellow-green."  The concept is equally important, for, Lewis writes, "if there be no 
interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered 
superfluous, the possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is 
in danger of becoming meaningless" (Lewis 1929, 39). While the concept can vary among 
different perceivers, the given, because it is given by the objects themselves, cannot vary, though 
we can fail to be attentive to it in all its detail. 
A. J. Ayer, in his 1940 book Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, also held a 
phenomenalist view of perception but, unlike Lewis, was reluctant to try to separate the given 
from the concept.  To talk of the given, he argued, leads us to conflate the perceived and the 
perceiving; that is, the material thing and the sense-datum.  Instead he proposed to keep these 
distinct by means of a specialized language.  This “sense-datum language” is the language of 
appearances, which describes the perception as it appears to the observer.  Looking at the tennis 
ball, you might say, in sense-datum-ese, "I am having a sensation of a round, yellow-green, 
fuzzy patch in my visual field."  Sense-datum language does not posit the existence of things 
that correspond to our perceptions, but refers only to that experience that the observer is actually 
having.  Thus "in the domain of sense-data whatever appears is real" (Ayer 1971 [1940], 123).  
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For Ayer, the issue of how to interpret perceptual experience is a matter of language, not a 
matter of fact. 
Rudolf Carnap, in his 1928 book The Logical Construction of the World (hereafter 
LCW), attempted to present a method for logically grounding scientific theories in perceptual 
data.  He contended that legitimate scientific talk can be reduced to talk about experiences and 
logical constructions out of experiences, and that each of us can do it for ourselves, provided we 
have a detailed enough description of the logical interconnections given by the scientific theory.  
The fundamental unit of confirmation of scientific theories is the “protocol sentence,” which is a 
phenomenalistic description of the observer's experience.  Carnap proposed a way of reducing 
scientific theories to their confirming protocol sentences.  To test a theory, a scientist was to 
deduce from the theory a set of observations that would appear to an observer given a certain set 
of initial conditions.  If the observer could affirm the protocol sentences, then the theory was 
confirmed to some degree.   Thus the truth of a theory could be determined, at least to some 
degree, by its empirical adequacy.  Later Carnap replaced the phenomenalistic language with 
physical descriptions of definite, quantitative, space-time points.  He considered this language 
better because it provided a unique description for all the senses and all observers.   But it is 
important to see that these physical descriptions are just as given as the phenomenalistic 
descriptions they replaced; only the form of the description has changed. 
These foundational theories were constructed to interpret and rationally reconstruct 
scientific theories.  They draw a distinction between the context of discovery, the processes by 
which individual scientists happen upon their hypotheses, and the context of justification, the 
empirical and logical method of confirming or disconfirming theories.  Justification, but not 
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discovery, is philosophically fathomable.  With this distinction these foundationalists claim that 
science can and should be value-free; that moral and social values are not to play a role in the 
justification of scientific theories. 
The foundational theories of science and perceptual knowledge met serious difficulties 
around midcentury with the work of Wilfrid Sellars and W. V. O. Quine.  Sellars, in his 1956 
paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," showed that the idea of the given element in 
experience was a myth.  The problem he recognized with givenness can be explained by the 
following argument.  First, it is clear that one thing cannot be at once inferential and 
non-inferential knowledge, by the law of the excluded middle.  The set of noninferential "raw 
data," which is what we are supposed to receive without conceptualizing, cannot itself give rise 
to inferences, because it is not yet categorized and therefore not linguistic.ii  The inferential 
element in perception is the part of the sense-data that is laden with judgment.  While we can 
draw inferences from it, it already is theorized information, not pure data.  Thus either the given 
is noninferential, in which case it cannot give rise to justified knowledge; or it is inferential, in 
which case it cannot be pure, indubitable, foundational knowledge.  Either way, this argument 
shows that phenomenalism cannot lead us to foundations in empirical knowledge.  Furthermore, 
it suggests that there can be no pure sense-data that are untainted by our own prejudgments; and 
hence that those prejudgments become interesting subjects of epistemological inquiry in 
themselves.  Appeal to "looks talk" (as in, "this tie looks green") or sense-datum language is of 
no help here, according to Sellars, because to say that an object looks green, one first has to 
master the claim that the object is green under some set of standard viewing conditions, and to 
know how to withhold endorsement of that claim when one is not certain whether the conditions 
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are standard.  That is, one has first to assume that the gap between sense-data and objects 
themselves is, in principle, a bridgeable gap, which is just what Sellars's argument denies. 
Quine, in his 1953 paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," presents another catastrophic 
argument for empirical foundationalism.  The two dogmas to which the title refers are, first, the 
idea that there is a sharp, and non-theory dependent distinction to be drawn between analytic and 
synthetic statements; that is, that there are two different kinds of sentences, one that is made true 
or false by the meanings of the words alone (what Ayer called a matter of language), and the 
other whose truth conditions depend on empirical facts (Ayer's matter of fact).  The second 
dogma is  reductionism, the idea that physical theories can be reduced to observation sentences 
and analytically connected bridge principles that connect the observation reports to theoretical 
entities and laws.  This is just Carnap's project in LCW.   
It seems reasonable to suppose that there is a component of language and a component of 
fact involved in determining the truth of sentences, and that therefore there should be a 
continuum of the amount of each in different sentences and thus some sentences in which the 
factual component is null.  Quine, however, showed that there is no neat, nonquestion-begging 
way of drawing the distinction.  He showed this by considering exhaustively the possibilities for 
defining analyticity and related notions, ultimately showing that they are all defined in relation to 
each other, and that in order to define any one of them we have to assume an understanding of at 
least some of the others.  Thus he concluded that the analytic-synthetic distinction is a 
metaphysical article of faith. 
The kind of reductionism at issue for Quine is the view that every statement can be 
translated into a statement about immediate experience.  By the time Quine was writing, Carnap 
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had given up phenomenalism in favor of physicalism, using as his basic protocol sentences 
sentences of the form "Quality q is at x;y;z;t'," where x;y;z;t defined a point in space-time.  
Quine then showed that the reductionist program of Carnap and others requires an undefined 
element that cannot be eliminated.  In the example, the phrase is at had to be the undefined 
primitive that indicated the givenness of the location.  Quine argued that the ultimate problem 
with reductionism is that it assumes that each sentence in isolation can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed.  In contrast, Quine proposed a holistic view of confirmation of science that has 
come to be known as the Duhem-Quine thesis: "Our statements about the external world face the 
tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" (Quine 1980, [1953] 
41). 
The two dogmas are closely connected. Quine even claims that they are "at root 
identical," because they both depend on the idea that the truth of a statement is completely 
analyzable into a factual and a linguistic component. (As we have noted, Ayer traded on this 
analysis.)  Reductionism concerns the truth conditions of the factual component; analyticity the 
linguistic component.  In both cases, the mistake stems from the idea that the unit of empirical 
significance is the statement or the term, when actually it is the whole of experience.  Thus, 
when we confront an experience that contradicts our beliefs or our theories, we have many 
possible options: we can reject the belief or theory, or we may readjust some of our other beliefs 
to account for the anomalous experience.   Once we accept holism, however, we come to see 
that the truth of theories is not uniquely determined by their empirical adequacy.  Sense data 
come to us already informed by our theories and not as raw data, and we reinterpret experience 
in light of our whole belief system.  Therefore, no one experience by itself counts against or for 
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a theory without all sorts of other background assumptions.  Given enough readjustments in our 
belief system, we can retain any theory in light of any experience.  This means that our theories 
are underdetermined by the empirical evidence we have for them.  We need to bring other 
values to bear in judging our scientific theories, values such as internal consistency, simplicity, 
and coherence with other beliefs and values. 
  Thus the history of epistemology in the first half of the twentieth century was marked by 
a great optimism for empirical foundationalism grounded in a logical analysis of language and 
theories, and by a subsequent rejection of that foundationalism.  The resulting holism or 
pragmatism left epistemologists to search for new criteria of adequacy for theories or knowledge 
claims.  Unless one can hold that the data reveal the hypotheses themselves, there is an 
epistemological gap between the evidence from the data and the hypotheses.  This gap is filled 
by background assumptions, including values, some of which, like the theoretical values of 
simplicity and coherence, are more or less consciously held by scientists, and some of which lie 
hidden from them. 
 
Epistemology without foundations: social constructivism 
The demise of empirical foundationalism leaves philosophers with the task of 
formulating new approaches to belief formation and justification.  But the distinctions between 
the process of belief formation, the context of discovery, and the context of justification now 
blur.  Justification cannot be viewed as a logical pursuit, free from the context of the scientists, 
for their culturally shaped background assumptions help determine how they gather and interpret 
evidence and assess theories.  That is to say, justification comes to be much like belief 
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formation, and therefore subject to the same contingent and value-laden motivations and 
background assumptions as the context of discovery. 
Postpositivist philosophy of science has therefore focused much more on the process of 
discovery and the practices of theory testing and analysis, trying to locate in these practices some 
identifying feature of the activity.  Postfoundationalist epistemology tries to justify confidence 
in that activity as a source of knowledge.   One important postfoundationalist epistemology that 
I shall defend is social constructivism.  This is the thesis that knowledge is essentially a social 
construction; that knowledge production is governed by a set of social norms that are justified 
within a community of knowers but that cannot be justified outside of all social norms or 
communities.  Knowledge, then, is relativized to the society in which it is produced and 
sanctioned.  But social constructivism does not give up the idea that knowledge production can 
be objective.  Helen Longino, in her book Science as Social Knowledge (1990), presents a 
version of a philosophy of science that would correspond to a conservative reading of social 
constructivism with what she calls contextualist empiricism. 
Contextual empiricists hold that the relation between theory and evidence contains a 
logical gap.  Evidence for a theory does not come with a label that explains what the data are or 
what they show; to believe otherwise is to fall prey to the myth of the given.  To interpret data 
as evidence for or against a particular theory requires some background assumptions.  For 
example, I come home around five o’clock, put my bicycle in the barn, and see three other bikes 
there.  From this I reason that my partner must be home.  Three bikes in a barn does not 
naturally mean he is home; I infer this because I have a particular set of background beliefs: that 
he goes places with his bike, that he does not have the habit of going for a walk alone in the 
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evening before I get home, that if he were doing something unusual this evening he would have 
told me about it, and so forth.  Now if I had slightly different beliefs, I might have inferred some 
other hypothesis, for example that he had not ridden his bike to work that day.  The logical gap 
between data and evidence and between evidence and theory is filled by such background 
assumptions.  In addition, our interests guide us toward certain questions and issues.  I might 
have inferred from the three bikes in the barn something about the number three, about the 
absence of bike thieves in the neighborhood, or about the amount of space left in the barn for 
other outdoor equipment.  But I was not interested in these things; I was interested at the time 
only in whom I might find in my house.  These background assumptions and interests which 
determine how data are relevant for us, are not, even in principle, specifiable in complete detail.iii 
What sorts of things count as background assumptions?  The psychological answer is 
that anything goes— political values, moral values, prejudices, causal beliefs, warranted and 
unwarranted assumptions of all sorts.  There is no limit.  The kinds of things that the positivists 
thought were influences only in the context of discovery turn out to play a role in the crucial 
justificatory practices of finding evidence and testing theories.  Epistemologists are not usually 
primarily interested in the psychological answer, though.  They want to know what the 
legitimate influences are. 
The background beliefs that come into play cannot all be transparent to the investigator 
or her peers.  This is because not all of our beliefs are transparent to us, and any of them can 
play a role.  It is difficult to give examples of current scientific theories that contain such hidden 
beliefs, because if I can name them they are not very hidden anymore.  But we have many 
historical examples.  Take chemists in the seventeenth century.  One of their background 
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beliefs (of which they were not aware) was that anything we could see had to be a substance.  
Flames had to be substances; and so they posited phlogiston.  Because of the unavoidable 
influences of background beliefs that are invisible to the scientist, scientific knowledge is 
relative to the beliefs of the scientific community, which are in turn influenced by the larger.   
This is a problem if we think that the goal of science is to ascertain the truth in a 
correspondence theory sense of truth.  The contextualist empiricist takes the internal goal of 
science as to extend its explanatory theories to wider arrays of phenomena, and to be coherent 
with what the community takes to be the known facts.  Science is characterized by an attempt to 
interpret empirical phenomena through experimental testing or similar confrontations with data.  
While truth may not be ascertainable, it can become clear when personal preferences or social 
biases lead to false, incoherent theories.  So science must also aim to clear out personal 
preferences and pernicious prejudices that hinder its pursuit of coherent, fruitful, empirical 
explanation. 
Science, on the contextualist view, is an essentially social activity in at least three 
senses.iv  First, it is the product of many people working together, and of different groups of 
people repeating, criticizing, and amending each other's theories.  John Hardwig has pointed out 
that many experiments in physics now require dozens of collaborating scientists, no one of 
whom can understand entirely the details of the experiments or the conclusions reached from 
them (Hardwig 1991).  They are essentially group projects, as is their acceptance and 
understanding by scientists.  Second, scientists undergo a common educational process.  They 
are trained in the same canon of examples and solutions; they share the same literature, beliefs, 
and epistemic values.  Furthermore, they typically are socialized into the same or similar 
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culture, and so share a set of background cultural interests and values.  Third, in an obvious and 
political sense science is social because it depends on the support of the larger society for 
funding.  This is much truer today than it was in previous centuries, since it has become so 
much more technology dependent and therefore expensive.  Science is supported by 
government, industry, and to a lesser extent, private philanthropy.  Large groups of people 
spend significant amounts of time deciding what are useful proposals for investigation, and so 
what questions will be asked, what experiments will be run, what field observations will be 
made, what techniques will be perfected, and when a research program has run its course.  Both 
the background assumptions and the interests of scientists are socially generated, and socially 
expressed through funding decisions. 
Given these social features of scientific enterprise, plus the the general agreement that 
science funding is a public good, and that science plays such a critical role in the development of 
society, justice clearly requires that as a society we offer equal opportunity to persons of all races 
and genders to create and influence the direction of science.  My project here, though, is to 
show that multiculturalism has cognitive benefits for science.  I argue that science will be better 
off, by its own internal goals, if society pursues a policy of multiculturalism within science and a 
policy of race and gender equality in the society as a whole.  While positivists could agree that 
justice requires society to pursue policies that diversify the population of scientists, they would 
disagree that this has anything to do with the epistemic goals of science.  To see how the 
contextual empiricist justifies the claim that it does, we now need to examine further the 
character of science. 
The empirical foundationalists believed that objectivity was guaranteed by adhering to 
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strict standards of rigorous hypothesis testing by evidence.  If a theory were a false description 
of reality, an anomalous experiment sooner or later would reveal that.  All the scientist had to do 
was to design experiments that would expose the truth would and to be open to interpreting the 
data correctly.  In the contextual empiricists view, there is no such neat relationship between 
theory and evidence; instead, the social character of science can make it objective.  Because 
they concede that knowledge is relative sociologically or historically, contextual empiricists do 
not therefore concede that scientific knowledge is subjective, or that anyone's beliefs are as good 
as anyone else's.  To see this, we need to focus on knowledge formation processes, or the 
practices of scientific investigation.   
By practices, I mean everything from the education of graduate students to the laboratory 
and field procedures of peer scientists, to the funding decisions of peer reviewers.  The first 
thing to notice is that the social character of science makes it public knowledge in two senses.  
First, its theoretical assumptions, methods, and even background assumptions are available to 
anyone who undertakes the same training and immersion in science.  Second, its evidence and 
explanations may be subjected to review and criticism by all who have this training and 
background.  The same things cannot be said of mystical or emotional experiences, which are 
clearly subjective experiences.  Science is self-critical; it proceeds by critical review of 
hypotheses and of the relevance of evidence to the hypotheses.  In the latter way, especially, 
background assumptions are revealed and questioned and sometimes modified.   
Longino uses a poignant example from the history of physics to illustrate this questioning 
of background assumptions and the consequent progress of science.   Before Einstein's relativity 
theory took hold, physicists believed that light was propagated through a medium called the 
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"ether."  (They believed that all waves had to be propagated in some medium.)  The 
Michelson-Morley experiment was supposed to measure the relative motion of the earth in the 
ether by the difference in the speed of light beams sent out at 90 degrees from each other.  That 
difference could be inferred from the shifts in the interference fringe the beams produced on an 
interferometer.  However, no significant displacement of the interference fringe took place.  
Some physicists interpreted this null result as a confirmation of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald 
contraction hypothesis.  By criticizing the background assumption of the existence of the ether, 
however, relativity theorists were able to abandon that assumption and make a significant 
advance in physical theory.  Science often progresses in this way by challenging the background 
assumptions that an experiment was not originally intended to test (Longino 1990, chaps. 3-4).  
These challenges come often not from the scientist who develops the experiment but from others, 
who can see the underlying background assumptions but do not share them.  The point is that 
the objective character of science comes from its practice of public, intersubjective, critical 
review.  But how can scientists critically assess their collective assumptions to root out personal 
preference and pernicious prejudices that hinder progress in the sciences when these preferences 
and prejudices are themselves socially influenced and maintained? 
 
Perspectives of the oppressed 
Longino explains well how background assumptions sometimes need to be rejected to 
move forward toward a better, more coherent, more fruitful explanatory theory.  In her book, 
she argues that culturally based prejudices against women have led scientists to make 
assumptions, for example, of universal male dominance, which not only turn out to be false on 
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direct examination but also to cause to misinterpretation of data and the construction of bad 
theories.  Still, this does not tell us how generally  we can influence science to discover its 
hidden assumptions that are based on social prejudice.   
Sandra Harding's notion of strong objectivity helps here.  She claims that  the main 
problem with the positivist notion of objectivity, which she terms "objectivism," is that it fails to 
recognize that when science or other knowledge-producing institutions are practiced by only a 
privileged section of society, they will overlook the same observations and problems with the 
theories that the practitioners would tend not to notice.  The result is not only bad science, but 
also further oppression and mystification of what knowledge is and how it is produced.  The 
solution, Harding argues, is to begin with those observations that are invisible to the privileged 
elite, in order to formulate new research programs and possibly new methodologies.  In Whose 
Science? Whose Knowledge? she writes that in "a society structured by gender hierarchy, 
'starting thought from women's lives' increases the objectivity of the results of research by 
bringing scientific observation and the perception of the need for explanation to bear on 
assumptions and practices that appear natural or unremarkable from the perspective of the lives 
of men in the dominant groups" (Harding 1991, 150).  The scientist should begin from the lives 
of the oppressed to gain a better understanding of phenomena, and the epistemologist also should 
do so for a better understanding of knowledge formation processes. 
One might object that this leads to a vicious regress of victimology, in which the most 
oppressed have the purest possible epistemic position.  One need only consider the implication 
that the elderly atheist lesbian woman of color with AIDS would have to be the best physicist to 
see how absurd such a position would be.  But Harding does not fall prey to this objection, 
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because she recognizes that not just any observations of the lives of the oppressed will be 
helpful.  Harding argues that the epistemologist or scientist who "begins from the lives of the 
oppressed," by which she means someone who recognizes the social nature of the oppression, 
has a less distorted picture of reality than the rest of us.  According to Harding, "women's 
experiences in themselves" do not necessarily provide reliable grounds for knowledge claims.  
Thus her distinction between beginning from “women's lives” and taking “women's experiences” 
for granted.   
Starting from women's lives does not mean taking for granted what women say about 
them.  Instead, we examine women’s situation from a theoretical, critical understanding of 
patriarchy, racism, and imperialism; that is, from a feminist and multiculturalist standpoint.  As 
an example, Harding mentions our understanding of rape within marriage, which, before the 
feminist movement, could not have come from women who thought rape in marriage a 
conceptual impossibility even while they suffered from it.  It was only when we could see 
women as oppressed through marriage, and as having human rights despite being in that 
institution, that we could see marital rape as a conceptual possibility.  If we take seriously the 
notion that all observations are theory laden, and we accept that some oppressed persons have 
mistaken or underdeveloped theories about their lives, we recognize that there are better and 
worse ways of understanding the experiences of the oppressed.  Equally, however, we notice the 
experiences of the oppressed only when we observe the lives of the oppressed with a sensitivity 
to their oppression.  That requires us to observe from the perspectives of the oppressed. It is 
quite plausible that the members of oppressed groups themselves would be more successful than 
the rest of us in making science take the perspectives of the oppressed into account.  Therefore 
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it is a plausible consequence of Harding’s arguments that science benefits from oppressed 
persons’ actually entering science.  Harding's concept of strong objectivity builds in 
contextualism,  requiring that the perspectives of the oppressed be mediated through theory.  In 
this way she avoids committing the multicultural version of the myth of the given by taking the 
data of the oppressed to have immediate, natural significance. 
Instead of the lone thinker seated before the fire, the metaphors that best fit the social 
constructivist epistemologist are Neurath's metaphor of the boat that one must constantly rebuild 
while one is afloat in it, and Rawls’s reflective equilibrium between theory and practical 
application.  Social constructivists must take the perspective of the oppressed but reconstitute 
that data using critical social theory.  In the face of enough contradicting evidence, they must 
also alter their theory to be consistent with their observations of the oppressed.  They rebuild 
their boat, trying to maintain an equilibrium between scientific theory and personal observations 
of the oppressed, and this makes their view of the world less distorted, less partial, than others'.  
To reformulate Descartes’ passage in light of these epistemological lessons, we realize that we 
cannot raze everything in our lives, down to the very bottom, so as to begin again from the first 
foundations.  If we want to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences, we should come 
together in all our diversity  critically to assess our collective background assumptions.  We 
should, in short, apply ourselves earnestly and openly to generally destroying our former 
opinions when they turn on assumptions that, we now can see, lead to incoherent theories. 
There are two senses in which multiculturalism has something to offer science, if this 
view of objectivity is correct.  First, when science pursues social policies that will bring people 
of color and women, false assumptions based on prejudice against these groups will become 
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noticeable and subject to critical inquiry.  Thus multiculturalism as a social project of ensuring 
diversity and equality will itself lead to better science.  Because strong objectivity does not 
require one actually to be a member of the oppressed in order to begin from the lives of the 
oppressed, nearly all scientists are likely to gain a better understanding of the ideological 
motivations of their theories under the influence of multiculturalism.  Second, those scientists 
who are members of oppressed classes will be most likely to question and critically assess 
background assumptions that degrade, defame, or otherwise harm their members.  Thus 
multiculturalism, considered as a broader representation of the human experience in science, will 
lead to better science.  
An important question at this point is where will multiculturalism make a difference.  
Will it make a difference in physics, biochemistry, the foundations of economic theory?  Or will 
it only make a difference in those theories that directly deal with race, sex, or gender?  Scientists 
and philosophers have only just begun the difficult work of showing where beginning from the 
lives of the oppressed is useful and where it is not.  I have little hope for a general solution to 
this question; it seems likely that it will turn out to be an empirical question in every case.v  If it 
does, then we need to look at work that attempts to build new theories from the perspectives of 
the oppressed.  There have been some significant results in all of the social and biological 
sciences and in the philosophy of science, if the general line of argument of this paper is correct. 
 The effects have been far wider ranging than simply theories about race or about sex or gender, 
though I hasten to add that given the right interests, these theories alone can be a significant 
portion of the social and biological sciences.  Two examples from the science most familiar to 
me, economics, show how bringing in a multicultural presence and sensitivity has changed 




Feminist Economics of the Family 
Even though "economics" comes from the Greek oikonomikos, referring to household  
management, economic theory has often neglected the family in the past.  Today we still see 
textbooks in which lists of important social institutions overlook the family (Ferber and Nelson 
1993, 5).  In the history of the discipline, we can see three models of the family: the 
father-as-dictator model, the aggregated household model, and recently, under the influence of 
feminist economics and the women's movement generally, the competing-but-unequal-agent 
model.  The first of these we can be traced at least to Hobbes, but perhaps is best summarized 
by James Mill: 
One thing is pretty clear, that all those individuals whose interests are 
indisputably included in those of other individuals may be struck off without 
inconvenience.  In this light may be viewed all children, up to a certain age, 
whose interests are involved in those of their parents.  In this light also, women 
may be regarded, the interests of almost all of whom is involved either in that of 
their fathers or in that of their husbands. (Quoted in Folbre and Hartmann 1988, 
188) 
This model assumes that women need protection by sovereign men, and that men will provide 
this protection without undue selfishness.  This makes attention to the family unnecessary 
theoretically; economic theory can assume that individuals are male and that whether they have 
wife and family is irrelevant. 
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In the 1960s economic theory began to look at households with what is called the "new 
home economics." The 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to the founder of the new 
home economics, Gary Becker of the University of Chicago.  Becker's motivation was to try to 
apply economic theory to all sorts of behavior that mainstream economics had overlooked: 
crime, animal behavior, and drug use, among others.  Becker argues that the family is guided by 
altruism, and that it acts to maximize total household utility.  He first endows each member of 
the family with an individual utility function that she or he tries to maximize.  Then he shows, in 
the Rotten Kid Theorem, that if there is an altruistic family member—by which he means a 
member whose utility function has other family member's utilities as arguments—then it is 
rational for the selfish family members to maximize total family utility as well (Becker 1981). 
Thus he derives the patriarchal family as an invisible-hand-result of each person pursuing her 
own good. 
Well, there is no arguing with mathematics.  But how shall we interpret this theory of the 
family?  Somewhat concealed by the mathematics are three other critical assumptions.  First, 
wealth or control of income is unequally distributed, so the altruist is able to redistribute income 
to maximize his utility function (I use "his" here because Becker quite explicitly assumes that the 
altruist is the father).  Second, it assumes that the egoists in the family (including the altruist's 
wife) have no better option than the one the altruist gives them. Third, the use of the positively 
ethically loaded term "altruist" presumes that his utility function ought to be maximized.  
Becker thus confirms the older economic view of the family as a unit, a single individual, 
represented by an altruistic “head.”  He thereby shows that there is no theoretical need to look 
inside those families.  In such a situation, there is no need for the intrusion of law; what Rawls 
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calls the "circumstances of justice" do not arise because ultimately there is no competition for 
resources.  The father's paternalistic wishes must be fulfilled.  Equality is not an issue.   
Becker believes that marriage evolved as a deal to protect women, and his model of the 
family seems to confirm that view.  Women can be seen as making a kind of Hobbesian deal: 
trading the promise of security for subjugation to sovereign power.  However, as feminists have 
been pointing out, the claim that marriage protects women does not square with the empirical 
evidence that it exploits and oppresses them, for instance, by longstanding, socially sanctioned 
spousal abuse.  Married women were, until relatively recently, prohibited from owning 
property, subject to unequal divorce laws, and affected by countless other laws and norms that 
constitute the double standard for married men and women.   
If his work is so faulty, how do we explain Becker’s Nobel Prize?  His theory is just 
what the dominant strain  of economists (in terms of theoretical as well as political 
commitments) love: it extends the neoclassical economic approach to a new area, the family, yet 
appears to vindicate the longstanding tradition of overlooking intrafamily economic issues, while 
justifying the political status quo concerning gender relations.  Thus, the comfortable, sexist, 
gendered, political ideology for economists lends the theory cognitive authority that it did not 
warrant scientifically. 
Since the 1980s a growing number of feminist economists have uncovered these hidden 
assumptions and interests behind economic theories of the family.vi  By paying attention to the 
inequalities in marriage and the consequent harm to women, they have been able to develop 
theories that can help guide social policy to address those harms.  The models these economists 
have developed are versions of what Amartya Sen calls the cooperative conflict model.  In this 
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model, each person maximizes her or his expected utility, recognizing the gains to be won from 
some cooperation and, at the same time, the conflict of interests among the agents.  Each spouse 
tries to maximize her or his own utility, there is a pool of goods to allocate, and each must agree 
to the allocation, on pain of the breakdown of the relationship.  Some readers may object that 
this model views families as the site of conflict rather than cooperation.  But that objection 
misses the point that all cooperation is ultimately motivated and justified ultimately by the 
interest of each party in the cooperation.  If there were no such interest for any member of the 
cooperative group, then that member would be acting against her interests; that is, she must be 
exploited or coerced.  This model reveals the degree to which each person's interests are 
satisfied, and thereby allows comparisons between spouses.  With the addition of general, 
gender-related features of the economy, this kind of model reveals institutionalized gender 
inequality in the society. 
The point of this example is to illustrate how hidden background assumptions about 
gender and economists’ interests lead to different theories.  In the earlier models, the economists 
assumed that men would head households, the best arrangement for all concerned.  This allowed 
economists to overlook injustices in families and even to assume that families were uninteresting 
economic institutions.  Feminist economists and the women's movement, which raised society’s 
sensitivity to issues of gender inequality, revealed the falsity of those assumptions.  
Furthermore, women economists have a direct interest in revealing gender injustice.  The result 
is a more nuanced theory of the family that fits much more of the data about gender and that can 
guide social policy regarding the family. 
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The Political Economy of Famines and the Career of Amartya Sen 
Until the groundbreaking work of the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, 
beginning in the 1970s, famine had not been a major concern of economic science since the 
eighteenth century.  Until Sen’s work, it was dogma among economists that famines were 
caused by food shortages or overpopulation and that free-market mechanisms would, if left 
unhindered by government interventions, solve the problem by supplying food in the region and 
at the localities where demand was greatest.  Sen, who as a child had witnessed the Great 
Bengal Famine of 1943, showed, through statistical research, that famines often happen when 
there is no shortage of food in the region where people are starving, and that famines happen in 
times of economic boom (the Great Bengal Famine was an example) as well as economic 
decline. (Sen 1981)  Sen was been able to show theoretically how market mechanisms can 
thwart relief efforts.  Indeed, during many famines food can be seen being exported from the 
affected region.  This happens because the people who need the food cannot “demand” it in the 
economic sense; that is, they have no legal entitlement to it because they cannot pay for it (Sen 
1981, p.161).   Sen’s theory of famines is that they are failures of entitlements, not food 
shortages. 
As a result of his work on famines, as well as his more general concerns with 
microeconomic theory, Sen has developed a theory of capabilities that rivals the expected utility 
theory on which current, neoclassical economics is founded (Sen 1987; Nussbaum and Sen 
1993).  While utilities are essentially expressions of subjective preference, capabilities measure 
individuals’ objective abilities to attain goods.   
Sen’s career as an economist has been nothing short of stellar.  He has made original and 
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important contributions to fields as diverse as social choice theory, welfare economics, 
development economics, economics of the family, and microeconomic theory.vii  His work is as 
broad as Gary Becker’s, and in many ways deeper.  In addition, Sen is surely the subtlest and 
most important philosopher among the economists.  He is celebrated widely as both.  Yet as of 
the writing of this article, he has never won the Nobel Prize for Economics.  There are, I think, 
two main reasons for this.  First, he has a multicultural and feminist outlook, expressed in his 
work through his choice of problem areas and his selection of collaborators.  Second, his keen 
philosophical mind leads him to question basic assumptions of economic theory.  In particular, 
his criticism of utility theory, especially the revealed preference form of it, alienates many 
economists.  Much of his work is seen as leading in mathematically intractable directions, and 
this diverges from the current passion for mathematics in economics.  Although these reasons 
are not directly connected to his being non-white (the Nobel Prize in Economics has had one 
previous non-white winner, Sir Arthur Lewis, 1979), I think there is an indirect connection in the 
sense that his work is not seen as mainstream.  Instead, with the exception of his work on social 
choice theory, it diverges a bit from the main interests of economics; one is tempted to say that it 
is too ethnic.  I find it somewhat ironic that famine and hunger could fail to be a central concern 
of economics. 
Sen’s work on famines and on capabilities illustrates how a multicultural outlook and 
experience can lead to productive new fields of research and to new theories in old territory.  Of 
course, it might be argued that Sen is simply a genius, and that genius, from any cultural 
background or either gender, will bring about novel and productive work.  While this may be 
true, it is also undoubtedly the case that Sen’s direct experiences with colonialism and famine led 
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There are two kinds of objections that I want to address in conclusion.  The first is what 
I call the "Barbarians At the Gate" objection.  Social constructivism degenerates into a 
subjective relativism, which holds that all knowledge is partial to some person or group of 
persons, and that there is no real hope for objectivity.  The best we can achieve is recognition of 
the partiality of our own theories.  “Knowledge” is a term that those in power use to "privilege" 
their beliefs and desires, and hence to justify their continued power over others.  "Science," 
likewise, simply names the practices they use to reap a greater share of social goods than others, 
and to develop technology that serves the interests of the powerful.  However, I have argued 
that it is possible to hold on to contextual empiricism and not have to give up the claim that 
science proceeds objectively, though it is not the unique form of inquiry to do so.  The relativist 
suggests that what needs to be done is to support all claims to knowledge, perhaps then to 
combine them to find the least partial truth by combining the most sources of data.  But it makes 
all the epistemic difference what we do with our data in this regard: what counts as data, how 
much weight each piece of data gets, how we reconcile apparently inconsistent data.  Answers 
to these questions are difficult theoretical issues, I grant, and the questions have been answered 
in the past in ways that further oppress certain groups.  But they must be answered to get 
anywhere at all.  Contextualist empiricism’s form of social constructivism offers this answer: 
the scientists themselves decide in open debate about the simplicity, empirical adequacy, and 
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coherence of the resulting theories, and questions about cultural, class, or gender bias are not 
ruled out of court. 
The second objection is what I call the "So What?" objection.  It is the claim that my 
view of what multiculturalism has to offer science is merely a practical point about doing 
science, not an epistemic point.  I have two responses here. First, to call it "merely" a practical 
point is a mistake.  Science is largely constituted by its practices.  To say that its practices need 
to be changed because that will make a difference in terms of the  theories we will accept seems 
to me a major point.  So I would challenge the dichotomy of epistemic and practical values that 
lurks in this objection.  Second, this objection does not properly recognize the epistemological 
gains.  The argument I have made is that social and cultural values and group-related interests 
play a role in the direction of research and in what counts as fact.  This latter point especially 
deserves emphasis.  If what counts as a fact, as a relevant phenomenon to be explained by a 
theory, is determined partly by the social groups who are allowed to be scientists, then what 
counts as a good, confirmed theory will depend also on who the scientists are.  I just fail to see 
how this could not be an epistemological point. 
Multiculturalism will lead to better science, by science's own criteria, than we have had 
with a race- and gender-exclusive community of scientists.  I have argued that this is true for 
two reasons.  First, the minority and women scientists themselves will be more likely to 
recognize the false, prejudiced assumptions about race and gender that have lurked in the 
background, guiding scientists as they interpret evidence and build theories.  Second, the kinds 
of changes that society will undergo in pursuing multiculturalism will help reveal these faulty 
assumptions and change the interests of scientists of all races and genders.  The interests of truth 
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and justice come together in the demand for diversity in science. 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to audiences at Wichita State University and 
Occidental College.  I thank the Philosophy Departments of those institutions for the 
opportunities to present my work, and the audiences there for helpful discussions.  I am also 
grateful for the thoughtful comments of Sandra Harding and three anonymous reviewers for 
Hypatia. 
1. The locus classicus of this approach is Quine 1969.  See also Kornblith 1985; Antony 1993. 
ii. This point was understood by Locke and by Berkeley, as well, as their blind man who 
suddenly regains sight.  See Locke 1975, 52; Berkeley 1979, First Dialogue. 
3. This claim comes from a thesis in cognitive science known as the "frame problem," which 
says that there is no principled way of delineating every possible relevant fact for making 
inferences from data. 
4. I owe the original description of these three senses to Longino 1990, chap. 4. 
 
5. See Anderson 1995 for several illustrative examples of the mistakes that feminist scientists 
have uncovered, 
vi. See McCrate 1987; Sen 1984; McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980. 
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7. In social choice theory, Sen is responsible for the theorem stating the “impossibility of a 
paretian liberal” and for various criticisms of the Pareto Principle; in welfare economics, he is 
best known for his analysis of measurements of welfare outcomes; in development economics, 
his theory of famines is his best-known achievement; in microeconomic theory he is best known 
for his criticism of revealed preference theory and his theory of capabilities.  Articles containing 
many of these contributions are collected in Sen 1982. 
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